xMatters Incident History

1. postmortemOct 24 · 00:21 UTC

   What happened? 

   On October 19, 2026, xMatters internal monitoring tools detected service degradation at 10:03 PM Pacific. Shortly after, some customers reported experiencing problems accessing xMatters or using integration and notification services. 

   Why did it happen? 

   Google Cloud experienced an outage affecting its EU-West-2 region. This disrupted xMatters services in the affected region. 

   How did we respond? 

   xMatters Support, Engineering, and Operations teams initiated the Major Incident Management process and mitigated the impact of the outage by failing affected systems over to another region. Services became available as systems transitioned. xMatters remained in Monitoring and verified service stability while Google continued recovery work in its affected region. 

   What are we doing to prevent it from happening again? 

   xMatters is designed with regional resiliency to mitigate the impact of infrastructure provider outages. During this incident, those resiliency measures operated as intended and enabled affected services to be transitioned to another region. Engineering and Operations are reviewing the incident resolution response to identify opportunities to further streamline recovery procedures and reduce recovery time during similar events.

Reported by xMatters on their status page.

1. postmortemOct 13 · 20:12 UTC

   What happened? 

   On October 1, 2026, xMatters monitoring first detected service degradation at 9:27 AM Pacific, and the first customer report was received at 10:03 AM. Customers in US-EAST1 experienced intermittent Web Interface access issues, API timeouts, and delays or failures when integrations initiated alerts and notifications. Some customers in US-CENTRAL1 may also have experienced voice notification issues during the same period. 

   Why did it happen? 

   During automated infrastructure scaling in US-EAST1, multiple application services became concentrated on the same compute resource. That resource reached its processing capacity, reducing the capacity available to serve customer requests. Service degradation continued across dependent xMatters functions while additional processing capacity was being added. 

   How did we respond? 

   As soon as the first customer reported an issue, xMatters Customer Support initiated the internal Major Incident Management process and engaged the Engineering and Operations teams. The incident response team increased service capacity, monitored the affected services, and verified recovery across the Web Interface, APIs, integrations, and notification processing. Service began stabilizing by 10:37 AM, and primary customer impact ended at 10:46 AM. The team continued monitoring before resolving the public incident at 11:56 AM. 

   What are we doing to prevent it from happening again? 

   Engineering is reviewing service capacity and workload distribution controls to reduce the risk of multiple critical services competing for the same compute resources. The team is also reviewing service health checks and alerting so that capacity issues are identified earlier to ensure required capacity is always available.

Reported by xMatters on their status page.

1. postmortemOct 16 · 16:24 UTC

   What happened?

   On September 21st, 2026, customers reported an issue to xMatters Client Assistance where SMS messages were failing to send to end users in North America.

   Why did it happen?

   The SMS delivery failures occurred because the short code used to send SMS messages became unavailable. The system should have automatically routed failed messages through the secondary messaging provider. However, the specific error returned for these failures did not trigger the configured failover process, causing disrupted SMS delivery to end users in the US and Canada.

   How did we respond?

   Once Engineering identified the SMS delivery issue, they initiated the Major Incident Management process and began removing the affected short code from the messaging configuration. During this process, Engineering encountered additional issues that prevented the system from automatically switching SMS traffic to the secondary messaging provider. Engineering manually intervened to complete the switch to the secondary provider and restore SMS delivery. After service recovered, Engineering monitored the system to confirm that SMS delivery was operating normally.

   What are we doing to prevent it from happening again?

   Engineering routed SMS traffic through the secondary messaging provider while they worked to restore the previous primary short code. Engineering is also addressing the failover behavior that prevented the system from automatically switching providers when this specific error occurred. These improvements to the process will reduce the risk of a similar short code issue disrupting SMS delivery in the future.

Reported by xMatters on their status page.