Central 1 Incident History

1. resolvedNov 5 · 16:32 UTC

   Central 1's technical team has confirmed that all November 2 missed return items have been processed and are reflected in this morning's report. Central 1 Support – support@central1.com - 1.888.889.7878, press 1

Reported by Central 1 on their status page.

1. resolvedNov 4 · 12:40 UTC

   The missing return items from November 2 are included in today's reports. Central 1 Support – support@central1.com - 1.888.889.7878, press 1

Reported by Central 1 on their status page.

1. resolvedNov 3 · 15:24 UTC

   We have resolved the issue affecting Two-Step Verification (2SV) code delivery via SMS text message. The root cause was determined to be the result of an internal system change implemented during overnight maintenance. The identified change has been rolled back, and SMS delivery of 2SV verification codes has been restored. Our teams are actively monitoring the service to confirm stability. Email delivery of verification codes remained operational throughout the incident. A post-incident review is being conducted, and a detailed postmortem outlining the root cause, resolution, and any corrective actions will be shared in the coming weeks. We apologize for the inconvenience and thank you for your patience while we worked to resolve the issue. DigitalBanking_Support@Central1.com 1.888.889.7878 (option 2)

Reported by Central 1 on their status page.

1. resolvedNov 1 · 21:49 UTC

   The service disruption affecting the Payment Stream Direct AFT service has been resolved, and service has been restored. Users can now access the AFT webpage as expected. We apologize for the inconvenience and thank you for your patience while the issue was being addressed.

Reported by Central 1 on their status page.

1. resolvedOct 26 · 16:07 UTC

   The issue affecting a subset of Forge mobile app users on iOS devices when using password login has been resolved. Investigation identified a Web Application Firewall (WAF) rule change that was impacting this specific login traffic. The rule has been adjusted and login functionality has been restored. Android users and biometric login were not affected, and the issue did not impact all Credit Unions or all iOS users. All relevant teams remain engaged and are monitoring the service. Further investigation will be completed with Intellect Design to understand why the WAF rule affected this traffic and to identify any appropriate preventative measures. Central 1 - DigitalBanking_Support@central1.com - 1.888.889.7878, press 2

Reported by Central 1 on their status page.

1. resolvedOct 23 · 19:35 UTC

   Central 1 recommends that PaymentStream AFT users with the Data Entry service review AFT records with due dates from November onward to verify their accuracy. The fix implemented on October 21 at 1:00 a.m. PT (4:00 a.m. ET) resolved the issue that caused due dates to shift back by one day when AFT records were created or modified. Please review any records created or modified before the fix was implemented to ensure the correct due date is reflected. Central 1 - Support@central1.com - 1.888.889.7878, press 1

Reported by Central 1 on their status page.

1. monitoringOct 22 · 18:25 UTC

   Central 1 recently completed an assessment of the newly disclosed zero-day vulnerabilities affecting PHP, a widely used technology that underpins many web-based platforms, including WordPress. We are aware that clients may have concerns regarding the potential impact to Forge online banking services. As part of our investigation, Central 1 reviewed the applicability of these vulnerabilities across our environment. The assessment determined that the identified PHP exposure was limited to a non-critical vanity URL redirect service used by a single client feature. As a precautionary measure, this service was taken offline. Additional housekeeping activities were also completed, including the removal of PHP from systems where it was not required and the removal of an obsolete service. As a result of these actions, the identified threat exposure has been contained, and no additional remediation activities are currently required. At this time, there is no evidence that Central 1 online banking services have been compromised or adversely affected by these vulnerabilities. We will continue to monitor the situation and follow our established security response processes should new information become available. DigitalBanking_Support@Central1.com 1.888.889.7878 (option 2)

Reported by Central 1 on their status page.

1. resolvedOct 20 · 12:19 UTC

   Central 1 has identified an issue where some organizations may not have received the CAD Online Return Processed Items (ORPI) and USD Cheque Return (ORUI) reports dated October 19, 2026, in this morning's MERG file. If your organization did not receive a report, or received a blank report, the missing report details will be included in tomorrow's MERG file. For Ontario credit unions, the reports will also be available in their SFTP folder. Central 1 Support - support@central1.com | 1.888.889.7878 (press 1)

Reported by Central 1 on their status page.

1. resolvedOct 21 · 18:41 UTC

   Central 1 has confirmed that the changes implemented last night have resolved the issue affecting AFT transactions where the due date could change by one day after an AFT record was created or modified. Central 1 - Support@central1.com - 1.888.889.7878, press 1

Reported by Central 1 on their status page.

1. postmortemOct 23 · 22:02 UTC

   Postmortem: INC229690 – 2SS Applications Unavailable (UM, Wires, AFT, EFM)

   On October 14, 2026, users experienced authentication and access failures across applications that rely on 2-Step Security (2SS), including User Management (UM), Wires, AFT, and EFM. Multiple clients reported being unable to access affected applications, including sign-in failures and HTTP 500 errors. The issue was resolved following a restart of the 2SS service, restoring access to the affected applications.

   Point of Failure: The outage was caused by an unintended application dependency on libraries contained within a backup folder located in the active 2SS webapps directory. Earlier in October, vulnerability remediation updates had been deployed to the 2SS environment, with a backup copy of the application retained in this directory as a rollback option. The backup was believed to be inactive and not part of the production application path.

   Following the deployment, a hard-token provisioning issue was investigated under a separate incident, INC229174. During troubleshooting, an older library within the backup folder was identified as potentially interfering with the newly deployed code. Because the folder was understood to be used solely for rollback purposes, its contents were removed to eliminate the possibility that the older libraries were contributing to the provisioning issue. However, the running application was actively referencing libraries contained within this location. Removal of those files therefore caused the 2SS service to fail, resulting in authentication and access failures across dependent applications.

   The vulnerability remediation deployment itself did not directly cause the outage. Rather, the incident exposed an unintended dependency within the application environment: files retained as a backup were being referenced by the running production application. The risk associated with removing the backup contents was therefore not known prior to the troubleshooting activity.

   During the outage, customers were unable to access applications dependent on 2SS, including User Management, Wires, AFT, and EFM. Reported symptoms included general sign-in failures, inability to access User Management and Wires, and HTTP 500 errors when accessing EFM. The 2SS service was restarted at 2:10 p.m. PT and service was restored at 2:11 p.m. PT. Affected customers subsequently confirmed successful access to their applications.

   Corrective Actions:

   Follow-up actions are focused on addressing the underlying application dependency and strengthening deployment and troubleshooting practices within the 2SS environment.

   • Separate backup artifacts from active application paths: Review the storage of application backups and rollback artifacts to ensure they are isolated from active production application directories and cannot inadvertently be referenced at runtime.
   • Validate application dependencies: Review the 2SS application configuration and dependencies to identify and eliminate unintended references to libraries or components outside the intended production application structure.
   • Strengthen deployment and rollback procedures: Update deployment and rollback practices to clearly distinguish active application components from backup copies and include validation following changes to application files.
   • Improve hard-token provisioning validation: Review opportunities to improve validation of hard-token provisioning following application changes, reducing reliance on post-deployment external validation.

   We sincerely apologize for the disruption caused by this incident and are taking these steps to strengthen our deployment and application management practices and reduce the likelihood of recurrence.

   Enquiries: Jason Seale | Director, Incident & Service Management | jseale@central1.com | 778.558.5627

Reported by Central 1 on their status page.

1. resolvedOct 14 · 22:04 UTC

   Application login using 2SS (2-Step-Security) may be failing Central 1 is aware that User Management (UM), EFM, AFT and Wires applications may have returned an error message between 2:10 to 2:15 p.m. PT (5:10 to 5:15 p.m. ET). Central 1’s technical teams are monitoring service for stability. If you are continuing to have sign-in errors please contact support. An update will be provided by 4:30 p.m. PT (7:30 p.m. ET). Central 1 - Support@central1.com - 1.888.889.7878, press 1

Reported by Central 1 on their status page.

1. resolvedOct 14 · 12:17 UTC

   Due to a technical issue, the EMCD (Detailed Transaction Listing) and EMC2 (Daily Detailed Transaction Report - Provincial Central) reports expected on October 14 were delayed and not included in this morning's MERG1014 file. We will include the delayed reports in tomorrow's MERG1015 file and FTP folders (ON). All reports, including EMC1, EMCC, EMCU, ECCX, EMCD, and EMC2, were processed successfully. Central 1 - Support@central1.com - 1.888.889.7878, press 1

Reported by Central 1 on their status page.

1. postmortemOct 23 · 03:34 UTC

   Postmortem: INC229450 – Interac e-Transfer Service Outage On October 9, 2026, Interac experienced an e-Transfer service disruption between approximately 9:21 a.m. and 9:45 a.m. PT \(12:21 p.m. and 12:45 p.m. ET\). During this period, financial institutions using the Interac e-Transfer platform experienced transaction failures, service disruptions, and delays. Interac reported that approximately 147,920 transactions were affected across all financial institutions. Following the initial recovery, Central 1 continued to observe a small number of transaction timeouts due to elevated Interac service latency until approximately 10:28 a.m. PT \(1:28 p.m. ET\). These timeouts subsequently recovered, and services returned to normal. In its postmortem, Interac confirmed that the incident was caused by "an Oracle software defect impacting Dynamic Resource Mastering operations," which resulted in a prolonged database hang and disrupted transaction processing. In simpler terms, a defect within Interac's Oracle database environment temporarily prevented the e-Transfer platform from processing transactions normally. Interac restored service by restarting the affected services, restoring database connectivity, and redistributing processing across its database environment. Performance remained elevated during stabilization but returned to normal once processing workloads were rebalanced. Interac has since implemented Oracle's recommended fix across its production environments and updated its Severity 1 communication procedures. Interac continues to work with Oracle to obtain a detailed root cause analysis and review how critical software defects are communicated. Central 1 will continue to monitor Interac's remaining corrective actions through Interac Problem PRB0042951. Interac's Corrective Action Status Target/Completion Date \* Obtain a detailed root cause analysis from Oracle In progress October 2026 \* Implement Oracle's recommended fix in the production environment Completed October 15, 2026 \* Update and reinforce timely Severity 1 communication procedures Completed October 16, 2026 \* Review Oracle's notification process for critical software defects In progress To be determined

Reported by Central 1 on their status page.

1. postmortemOct 13 · 17:04 UTC

   Postmortem: INC227360 – Interac e-Transfer 3.4 Service Outage

   On September 10, after successfully implementing the RTR Settlement & Reconciliation solution, Central 1 initiated a planned activity to load historical data required for reporting. During this activity, an issue interrupted Interac e-Transfer 3.4 send and receive services between 3:56 p.m. and 4:06 p.m. PT (6:56 p.m. and 7:06 p.m. ET).

   Point of Failure: During the data load activity, an unexpected issue impacted production transaction processing, temporarily interrupting Interac e-Transfer 3.4 send and receive services. The disruption lasted approximately 10 minutes. Interac e-Transfer 3.5 services were not affected.

   The team restored service by stopping the data load activity and returning the environment to normal operation. Following recovery, the remaining historical data load work was reassessed and completed using a revised approach designed to minimize operational risk. Central 1 has reviewed the incident and implemented additional controls to strengthen the management and execution of future data migration activities and further reduce the risk of service disruption.

   Corrective Actions (PRB011767)

   Completed

   • Reviewed and enhanced the data replication process to ensure future activities are performed during approved maintenance windows.
   • Reviewed change management procedures to strengthen risk assessment and implementation oversight.
   • Updated review procedures to require Database Administration (DBA) involvement for large-scale data extraction, migration, and replication activities.
   • Redesigned the historical data replication process to reduce operational risk.

   Planned (Q4 2026)

   • Improve early engagement between Project and Technical teams to enhance planning, risk identification, and execution readiness for future initiatives.

   We sincerely apologize for the disruption and the impact this incident may have had on your operations. We appreciate your patience and understanding while we restored service, and we thank you for your continued partnership.

   Liz Ackroyd
   Manager, Client Support Services
   eackroyd@central1.com | 905.301.1337

Reported by Central 1 on their status page.

1. investigatingOct 29 · 21:47 UTC

   Our Development and Support teams continue to actively investigate reports of saved login credentials unexpectedly being cleared within the iOS Forge App. We recognize that this issue has been ongoing for an extended period of time and understand the frustration this has caused for clients and affected users. Please be assured that we remain fully committed to this investigation and continue to pursue all available avenues of troubleshooting. Since our previous update, we have continued reviewing available diagnostic information and testing various scenarios in an effort to better understand the behaviour. While we have received assistance from affected users testing debug versions of the production iOS application, the information collected to date has not identified a clear root cause. Although we have observed some encouraging developments through our testing efforts, further validation and analysis are still required. That said, our testing has indicated that a version of the App incorporating changes currently present in the debug build may help reduce occurrences of saved login information being cleared. It is important to note that instances of the issue have still been reported, and the underlying cause remains unknown despite the encouraging results observed to date. As such, this version should not be considered a permanent resolution or guaranteed fix. Rather, it is being made available as an optional upgrade path for clients while our investigation continues. Availability of this upgrade is currently targeted for the end of this week, which will allow our Development team additional time to finalize and refine the App build prior to deployment. Clients interested in exploring this upgrade option, or who have any questions regarding the new App version, are encouraged to respond within their respective incident or via email. Thank you for your continued patience and partnership as we work toward a resolution. DigitalBanking_Support@Central1.com 1.888.889.7878 (option 2)

Reported by Central 1 on their status page.