checked Nov 8, 2026 12:35 PM UTC · GitHub's official status page
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32 reports published by GitHub in the last 30 days
When GitHub breaks, it is typically resolved in 58m — median across 26 resolved incidents over 30 days.
resolvedNov 8 · 12:32 UTC
This incident has been resolved. Thank you for your patience and understanding as we addressed this issue. A detailed root cause analysis will be shared as soon as it is available.
Reported by GitHub on their status page.
resolvedNov 6 · 00:20 UTC
This incident has been resolved. Thank you for your patience and understanding as we addressed this issue. A detailed root cause analysis will be shared as soon as it is available.
Reported by GitHub on their status page.
resolvedNov 5 · 17:42 UTC
This incident has been resolved. Thank you for your patience and understanding as we addressed this issue. A detailed root cause analysis will be shared as soon as it is available.
Reported by GitHub on their status page.
resolvedNov 4 · 18:16 UTC
Please refer to the combined summary in this related incident: https://www.githubstatus.com/incidents/xr3myzj7ms51
Reported by GitHub on their status page.
resolvedNov 4 · 17:01 UTC
On November 4, 2026, between 15:49 UTC and 16:48 UTC, and again between 17:20 UTC and 17:55 UTC, GitHub Actions, Pages, Webhooks, Code Scanning, and Copilot coding agent experienced delays. During this time, Actions workflow runs and job status updates were delayed by up to 25 minutes. Pages deployments dropped to about 4% of normal volume, webhook deliveries dropped to about 58% of normal volume, and Code Scanning analyses and Copilot coding agent sessions were delayed. Delayed events were processed after mitigation.
This incident was caused by a configuration change to an internal event-routing service that unexpectedly paused delivery of several event streams. The change depended on feature flags that were not set up as intended, which the service did not handle gracefully. We mitigated the first period by rolling back the configuration change at 16:14 UTC. The code change itself was not reverted by the rollback, so a subsequent deployment reintroduced it. We mitigated the second period at 17:40 UTC by rolling back again, then processed queued events and cleared backlogs.
We are taking several steps to prevent a repeat. The routing service will keep its existing behavior when a feature toggle is missing, so a misconfigured flag can no longer pause delivery. We are adding a pre-deploy check that each routing flag exists and is registered under the correct owning service, and we are making flag ownership less error-prone to set. We are also improving alerting so we detect paused event delivery sooner.
Reported by GitHub on their status page.
resolvedNov 4 · 11:50 UTC
This incident has been resolved. Thank you for your patience and understanding as we addressed this issue. A detailed root cause analysis will be shared as soon as it is available.
Reported by GitHub on their status page.
resolvedNov 4 · 10:01 UTC
This incident has been resolved. Thank you for your patience and understanding as we addressed this issue. A detailed root cause analysis will be shared as soon as it is available.
Reported by GitHub on their status page.
resolvedNov 3 · 22:41 UTC
On November 3, 2026, between 15:00 UTC and 22:37 UTC, Git operations over HTTPS on GitHub.com were degraded. Clones, fetches, and pushes over HTTPS were slow, and some failed. For about half of Git HTTPS traffic, median response time rose from under 100 milliseconds to as high as 5 seconds. On average, the error rate was 0.65% and peaked at 1.29% of requests to the service. Git operations over SSH were not affected.
This was due to a buildup of excess connections on the hosts that serve Git HTTPS traffic, which saturated their network capacity and caused slow and failed responses for all clients served by those hosts.
We mitigated the incident by blocking a client traffic pattern at our load balancers and reloading them, which released the excess connections. The block also prevented some users of one third-party integration from performing Git operations over HTTPS until we removed it on November 4 at 13:26 UTC.
We are working to alert on sustained Git HTTPS latency sooner and make load balancer mitigations take effect on existing connections immediately.
Reported by GitHub on their status page.
resolvedNov 3 · 13:56 UTC
This incident has been resolved. Thank you for your patience and understanding as we addressed this issue. A detailed root cause analysis will be shared as soon as it is available.
Reported by GitHub on their status page.
resolvedNov 2 · 18:24 UTC
This incident has been resolved. Thank you for your patience and understanding as we addressed this issue. A detailed root cause analysis will be shared as soon as it is available.
Reported by GitHub on their status page.
resolvedOct 30 · 23:29 UTC
On October 30, 2026, between 20:15 and 21:56 UTC, an advisory-publication-driven fan-out caused an unexpected saturation of network connections to the Dependabot alerts datastore. During this period we observed a high rate of write failures on this datastore; users saw elevated failure rates when dismissing or resolving Dependabot alerts, as well as failures when linking Dependabot update pull requests to Dependabot security alerts. We also observed delays in creating and updating security alerts that extended through November 2, 2026.
The unexpected fan-out was caused by a missing job queue throttle after the queues for the fan-out work were migrated as part of system maintenance. We have restored the fan-out throttle and further isolated and throttled these processes to guard against further disruptions.
Reported by GitHub on their status page.
resolvedOct 30 · 19:23 UTC
On October 30, 2026, from 17:50 to 18:32 UTC, Actions, Pages, and Webhooks experienced degraded performance. Actions workflow processing, Pages deployments, and webhook deliveries were delayed, and code search and live updates returned errors. Some Actions queues took additional time to drain after mitigation, and the incident was resolved at 19:23 UTC.
The impact was triggered by maintenance on a cloud network gateway connecting an Actions service in the GitHub data center to Redis clusters in the Central US Azure region. The service's Redis client retried aggressively and redialed those connections. That produced a connection storm that saturated the gateway, with about 90% of connection attempts failing. Other services sharing the same network path were degraded as well.
We mitigated the incident by removing the affected resources from rotation, which ended the connection storm and allowed the gateway to recover. We have already reduced the number of connection retries in the impacted service and are further improving retry behavior with jittered backoff, shorter connect timeouts, and retry budgets. We are also working with our infrastructure team to make GitHub more resilient to gateway maintenance.
Reported by GitHub on their status page.
resolvedOct 30 · 15:02 UTC
This incident has been resolved. Thank you for your patience and understanding as we addressed this issue. A detailed root cause analysis will be shared as soon as it is available.
Reported by GitHub on their status page.
resolvedOct 29 · 12:49 UTC
On October 29, 2026, between 05:50 UTC and 12:40 UTC, Copilot agent sessions on GitHub.com and in VS Code were degraded. Live session updates often failed to load, and on average 2.14% of requests to the agent sessions service failed, with a peak of 8.61%. For about 10 minutes around 09:20 UTC, up to 40% of requests to list or create agent sessions failed. Copilot Chat on GitHub.com showed degraded agent session features during this time. The issue occurred when a large increase in task-list requests from a client experiment overloaded the cache that supports the agent sessions service. We mitigated the impact by increasing cache capacity, reducing nonessential load on the cache, and disabling the client experiment. We are moving rate limiting to separate infrastructure, reducing client polling, and improving our alerting so we can detect and respond to this type of overload faster.
Reported by GitHub on their status page.
resolvedOct 28 · 15:28 UTC
On October 28, 2026, between 13:52 and 15:24 UTC, Copilot users saw errors when using several GPT-family models and the MAI Code 1.1 Flash model. Affected experiences included Copilot Chat in IDEs and on GitHub.com, the Copilot CLI, Copilot Code Review, the Copilot Coding Agent, Code Scanning Autofix, and Code Quality. About 9.73% of requests to the affected models failed, with a peak of about 36.97% at the start of the incident.
The errors happened because a credential that we use to authenticate with an upstream model provider became invalid. We mitigated the incident by replacing the credential and redeploying the service. We are strengthening how we manage credentials for upstream providers to prevent this type of failure, returning retryable errors when an upstream provider rejects a request, and improving our monitoring so that we detect and mitigate this type of problem faster in the future.
Reported by GitHub on their status page.
resolvedOct 27 · 08:00 UTC
Between 0655 and 0801 UTC on 10/27, customers experienced increased failure rates for API and git requests authenticated with server-to-server tokens for GitHub Apps (excluding Actions tokens). During this window, authenticated git operations mistakenly returned 404 for 1.24% (2.6x) of requests on average and 2.49% (5.3x) at peak. These failures were caused by a scheduled maintenance event where GitHub migrated 7 tables between two MySQL clusters in our IAD and Azure Central US datacenters. One of the affected tables stores installation records for GitHub App server-to-server tokens (excluding Actions). We've successfully completed several of these migrations in recent months without notable customer impact. However, in this case, the migration coincided with a scheduled cleanup job on the installation records table, which deleted approximately 59 million records from 0444-0617 UTC. As a result, the gh-ost tooling used in the migration experienced inter-cluster replication delays (up to 1 hour at peak). At 0655 UTC, we begin transitioning reads of the target tables to the new MySQL cluster, with 100% of reads cutover at 0721 UTC. Customer impact began, but was not detected, throughout the read cutover and persisted until completion of the write cutover at 0801 UTC. We are updating our processes and automation to prevent a repeat of this incident, including disabling overlapping cleanup jobs prior to these migrations and blocking the cutover of reads when replication delays are high.
Reported by GitHub on their status page.
resolvedOct 26 · 18:57 UTC
This incident has been resolved. Thank you for your patience and understanding as we addressed this issue. A detailed root cause analysis will be shared as soon as it is available.
Reported by GitHub on their status page.
resolvedOct 24 · 00:23 UTC
Between 23:28 and 00:23 UTC on October 27, 2026, GitHub Copilot experienced degradation affecting Grok 4.6 and Grok 4.7 models. Users encountered elevated error rates when using these models.
The degradation was caused by an issue with an upstream model provider. GitHub engineers detected the issue through automated monitoring and coordinated with the provider. Our automated model-warning system activated in-product warnings for affected models during the incident. Service returned to normal after the provider implemented a mitigation.
Reported by GitHub on their status page.
resolvedOct 23 · 18:51 UTC
We identified that an advisory-publication driven fan-out was overwhelming Dependabot alert processing on repositories by saturating the queue with its own events, delaying processing of events related to repository pushes.
We have now isolated this fan-out and applied a throttle so it runs at a fixed rate and cannot delay other events. This remediation has successfully prevented a new fan-out process impacting users.
Reported by GitHub on their status page.
resolvedOct 23 · 08:05 UTC
On October 23, 2026, between 07:06 UTC and 07:27 UTC, GitHub Actions workflow run results were delayed. Job status, check run updates, and logs in the GitHub UI and API updated with an average delay of about 2 minutes, and some updates were delayed by up to about 7 minutes.
During this window, a storage dependency that Actions uses to process workflow logs and artifacts throttled our requests. This slowed result processing, causing updates to queue up. The queue was fully processed by 07:27 UTC, shortly after the throttling stopped.
To reduce the risk of recurrence, we have added several storage accounts to increase capacity, and we are working on additional steps to continue to scale. We are also working with our storage provider to understand why the throttling occurred, and improving how result processing handles storage throttling and how quickly we detect it.
Reported by GitHub on their status page.
resolvedOct 23 · 02:30 UTC
This incident has been resolved. Thank you for your patience and understanding as we addressed this issue. A detailed root cause analysis will be shared as soon as it is available.
Reported by GitHub on their status page.
resolvedOct 22 · 15:18 UTC
On October 22, 2026, from 13:05 to 15:20 UTC, our event streaming platform was degraded resulting in elevated job processing latency spikes of 19-35 seconds and elevated job processing times of 4m – this resulted in delayed Actions workflow and step results (up to 13m), notifications (20m) and repository push events (12m). Recovery for repositories began at 14:32, with Actions recovery beginning at 14:59. The issue reoccurred at 16:26 again impacting Actions runs, repo push events, and notifications. Recovery began at 17:16 and completed at 2:07.
The incident was caused by a significant increase in load coupled with client connection storms during a deployment overloading our Kafka event streaming brokers.
To prevent future recurrence, we have expanded the affected cluster, shifted traffic to less loaded clusters, and implemented tunable client reconnect backoff.
Reported by GitHub on their status page.
resolvedOct 21 · 19:22 UTC
This incident has been resolved. Thank you for your patience and understanding as we addressed this issue. A detailed root cause analysis will be shared as soon as it is available.
Reported by GitHub on their status page.
resolvedOct 19 · 16:56 UTC
On October 19, 2026, between 15:24 and 16:52 UTC, GitHub Actions, GitHub Pages, and webhooks generated by Actions were degraded. Live updates on GitHub.com and code search were also degraded for part of this time. No data was lost.
Impact
- Workflow status updates, logs, and checks were delayed.
- 5.13% of jobs on GitHub-hosted runners were delayed in starting, and 0.02% of workflow runs failed.
- During the first 30 minutes, 8.47% of requests to the Actions jobs REST API returned errors.
Pages deployments and webhooks generated by Actions runs were delayed.
An internal Actions service that stores logs and run status lost connections to some of its cache servers in one cloud region and immediately retried them from every server at once. The resulting surge of new connections overloaded a shared network link between our data center and that region, which also disrupted other services that use the same link. We mitigated the incident by moving the Actions service off the affected cache servers and reducing connections from other services on the link. We then processed the delayed Actions work. We are continuing to investigate the cause of the initial connection timeouts.
We were already in the process of rolling out a limit on how quickly this service can open new connections, but it was still in shadow mode (logging only, not enforcing) at the time of the incident. We have since fully enforced it and capped the service's concurrent connection attempts. We are extending these limits to other Actions services, adding backoff to retries, limiting how much shared network capacity a single service can use, and improving alerting so we can find the source of connection surges faster.
Reported by GitHub on their status page.
resolvedOct 15 · 18:56 UTC
We suspected that CCA Automations were experiencing delays when users start an Automation, but further investigation found that there was no delay or impact to CCA Automations.
Reported by GitHub on their status page.
resolvedOct 13 · 20:30 UTC
On October 13, around 20:42 UTC, an infrastructure failure caused GitHub Actions to have delays showing logs for workflow runs. No logs were lost and the issue has now been resolved and log processing has caught up. The actual workflows producing the logs were not impacted and ran normally and no run delays or check delays occurred.
Reported by GitHub on their status page.
resolvedOct 12 · 20:16 UTC
On October 12th 2026 11:51 UTC GitHub experienced elevated 500 responses across several application pages. This caused failures on Issues and Pull Requests as well as Projects and Actions. Customers also experienced delayed notifications in their web inbox and via email.
The immediate impact to Issues, Pull Requests, Projects, and Actions was mitigated by 12:41 UTC on October 12th. Notifications deliveries to the web inbox and via email were recovering at 15:27 UTC and fully mitigated by 20:16 UTC.
The incident was triggered through a latent condition in our notifications delivery pipeline that put a high volume of an expensive query on our sharded database replicas. This reduced available database capacity to serve requests for Issues, Pull Requests, Projects, and Actions.
We have fixed the notifications pipeline’s code path that issued the expensive query. We are also improving resilience of the database layer to reduce the likelihood and impact of similar incidents.
Reported by GitHub on their status page.
resolvedOct 7 · 18:04 UTC
On October 7, 2026, from 16:52 to 17:01 UTC, GitHub experienced a recurrence of the write-operation outage from earlier that day. Both outages shared the same root cause. Please refer to the combined summary covering both incidents, their impact, and our prevention measures: https://www.githubstatus.com/incidents/djlmxz2zd0j7
Reported by GitHub on their status page.
resolvedOct 7 · 16:25 UTC
On October 7, 2026, GitHub had two outages of write operations with the same cause, totaling about 19 minutes. The first ran from 15:06 to 15:16 UTC (about 10 minutes) and the second from 16:52 to 17:01 UTC (about 9 minutes). In both windows, actions that save or change data failed across Git operations, pull requests, issues, GitHub Actions, the API, webhooks, sign-in and authentication, GitHub Apps and OAuth, code scanning, Codespaces, and Copilot. Reading data was largely unaffected. In the first outage, 5.6% of all web and API requests failed, peaking at 8.9%, and more than 12,000 organizations saw failed requests. Up to 26% of Git authentication requests failed, and 17% of Actions workflow runs failed with infrastructure errors. In the second outage, 6.2% of web and API requests failed, peaking at 9.3%, and more than 11,000 organizations were affected. Up to 25% of Git authentication requests failed, and 19% of Actions workflow runs failed. No databases experienced data loss, and operations retried after recovery succeeded. GitHub relies on an internal service that keeps track of which database servers should receive new and updated data. While replacing machines that run this service as part of regular maintenance, one of the new machines started with an outdated copy of its records, which still listed database servers we had already retired. When this node came online, it incorrectly modified routing configuration with the outdated records, routing write requests to non-existent database servers. Each outage ended when one of our established machines with correct configuration became the leader of the quorum and sent the correct configuration. After the first outage, we identified the new machine as the source and paused automated maintenance to stop it from being leader again. At 16:52 UTC, an automated maintenance task that did not honor the pause put it back in charge, and the outage happened again. We shut that machine down at 17:02 UTC and have since removed it, and the automation now honors the pause, which was a new regression due to an update of our puppet infrastructure. To prevent recurrence, we are clearing retired database servers from the service's records before any new machine is added, and we are keeping new machines from being elected leader until their records have been checked. We are also changing our systems to reject configuration that point to servers that don't exist and to keep using the last known-good settings instead. Finally, we are giving responders a faster way to take a misbehaving machine out of service, and adding alerts so changes like this are spotted within seconds. We will share a more detailed write-up of these incidents in our monthly availability report, along with the status of the repairs we are making to prevent issues like these in the future.
Reported by GitHub on their status page.
resolvedOct 6 · 23:40 UTC
On October 6, 2026, from 19:44 to 19:50 UTC, GitHub experienced a service outage with elevated error rates peaking at 1.30% of all requests, totaling approximately 1.16 million failed requests. This impacted 12 services across GitHub, including Pull Requests, Webhooks, Repos, OAuth, Git over SSH, Codespaces, and Gists. The incident was triggered by GitHub Enterprise Importer (GEI) making multiple, long duration queries which saturated a database connection pool. Recovery was seen at approximately 19:50 UTC once the migration's calls stopped; GEI migrations were reenabled at 23:32 UTC after a code fix was merged.
We have completed a detailed root-cause review and are implementing improved database-health safeguards. We will continue to review and add additional safeguards to prevent future recurrence.
Reported by GitHub on their status page.
resolvedOct 6 · 01:32 UTC
On October 5, 2026, between 23:05 UTC and 00:11 UTC on October 6, some users experienced slow page loads, timeouts, and errors when accessing organization and enterprise billing, licensing, and settings pages. On average, the error rate was 1.9% and peaked at 13.8% of requests to the service that powers these pages.
This was caused by a networking failure, which disrupted connectivity between one of our on-premises datacenter regions and a subset of cloud-hosted regional database services. We mitigated the incident by shifting the database traffic to a healthy region.
We are working to make regional database failover faster and more complete, reduce timeouts so these pages fail fast instead of hanging, and add latency-based alerting to reduce our time to detection and mitigation of issues like this one in the future. We continue to partner with our cloud provider to understand the underlying network failure.
Reported by GitHub on their status page.
resolvedOct 1 · 17:56 UTC
On October 1, 2026, GitHub Actions experienced two periods of delayed and failed job starts on GitHub-hosted runners, beginning at approximately 14:15 UTC. Across the 14:15–17:56 UTC incident-response window, approximately 0.68% of workflow runs experienced start delays, and 0.196% of jobs failed to start.
A routing change at our cloud provider concentrated API traffic on a single backend, causing an increase in rate-limit errors. Incorrect retry behavior in the provider’s inventory service added load to the affected APIs, compounding the rate limiting. This disrupted runner provisioning and reduced available capacity in affected regions. The resulting increase in demand in unaffected regions exposed a concurrency limit in our job-assignment system, delaying jobs even where runners were available.
During the response, we increased job-assignment concurrency, scaled runner capacity, and worked with our cloud provider to reduce API load by excluding our runner subscriptions from its inventory service. By approximately 16:15 UTC, jobs were starting and executing as expected. We continued mitigation and monitoring until the incident was resolved at 17:56 UTC.
Our cloud provider has since increased resource-management API rate limits for our workloads. To reduce the likelihood and impact of similar incidents, we are also adding more granular rate-limiting alerts and updating our job-assignment system to handle increased demand across fewer available regions.
Reported by GitHub on their status page.
